Publications

EC Lab@TAU Past and forthcoming publications

Publications
EC Lab@TAU Past and forthcoming publications

Publications

 

Book Chapters

  • Incentives in Peer-to-PeerSystems
    John Chuang, Michal Feldman and Moshe Babaioff
    In Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, Editors: Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay Vazirani
  • Secretaries and Prophets
    Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier
    In Online and Matching-Based Market Design. Editors: Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming)

Working Papers

  • On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing
    Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
    arxiv ]
  • Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding
    Michal Feldman and Galia Shabtai
    arxiv ]

2020+Forthcoming

  • On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets
    Ben Berger, Alon Eden and Michal Feldman
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2020 (WINE'20)
    arxiv ]
  • Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin and Zhihao Gavin Tang
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020 (EC'20)
    arxiv ]
  • Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer
    Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020 (EC'20)
    arxiv ]
  • A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ophir Friedler
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020 (EC'20)
    arxiv ]
  • Pricing Multi-Unit Markets
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
    ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7(4): 20:1-20:29 (2020)
    journal | conference ]
  • Approximate Modularity Revisited
    Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
    SIAM Journal on Computing (SICOMP), forthcoming.
    journal | conference | arxiv ]

2019

  • Online Random Sampling and Applications to Budgeted Settings
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
    Theory of Computing Systems, Special Issue on SAGT'17, 63(7): 1470--1498, 2019.
    conference | journal ]
  • Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Matt Weinberg
    Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'19), 2019.
    arxiv | conference ]
  • Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, and Anna Karlin
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (Best Paper with a Student Lead Author Award)
    arxiv ]
  • Stable Secretaries
    Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
    Algorithmica, 81(8): 3136--3161 (2019).
    conference | arxiv | journal ]
  • Max-Min Greedy Matching
    Alon Eden, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman
    International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX'19), 2019. Also presented at EC Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2019)
    arxiv | conference | workshop ]
  • A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ophir Friedler
    EC Workshop on Workshop on Behavioral Economics and Computation, 2019.
    arxiv ]
  • Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren and Moshe Tennenholz
    ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), 7(3): 14:2--14:27, 2019.
    arxiv | journal | conference ]
  • Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff
    Yossi Azar, Allan Borodin, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kineret Segal
    Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'19), 2019
    conference ]

2018

  • Interdependent Values without Single Crossing
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
    arxiv | conference ]
  • Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ilan Nehama
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
    arxiv | conference ]
  • 99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition
    Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler and Aviad Rubinstein
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
    conference ]
  • Pricing Identical Items
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2018 (WINE'18)
    arxiv ]
  • Prompt Scheduling of Selfish Agents
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Tzahi Taub
    26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA'18), 2018
    arxiv ]
  • An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kineret Segal
    writeup | arxiv ]

2017

  • Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
    Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim and Brendan Lucier
    Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2017 (FOCS'17)
    arxiv | conference ]
  • Approximate Modularity Revisited
    Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
    ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2017 (STOC'17)
    conference | arxiv | journal ]
  • The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    conference | arxiv ]
  • A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    conference | arxiv ]
  • Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
    Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Alan Roytman
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    conference | arxiv ]
  • Stable Secretaries
    Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    conference | arxiv | journal ]
  • Pricing Social Goods
    Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman
    European Symposium on Algorithms, 2017 (ESA'17)
    conference | arxiv ]
  • Online Random Sampling and Applications to Budgeted Settings
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17) Best Paper Award.
    conference | journal ]
  • Liquid Price of Anarchy
    Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)
    conference | arxiv ]
  • The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics
    Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)
    arxiv | conference ]

2016

  • Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
    Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
    SIAM Journal on Computing, 45(1): 29--48 (2016)
    conference | journal | arxiv ]
  • Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
    Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
    ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(1):8:1-8:26 (2016)
    conference | arxiv | journal ]
  • Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers
    Michal Feldman, Tomer Koren, Roi Livni, Yishay Mansour, Aviv Zohar
    NIPS 2016: 3864-3872 (NIPS'16)
    conference ]
  • Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
    Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan
    WINE 2016: 131-144 (WINE'16)
    arxiv | conference ]
  • Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap
    Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
    International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, 2016 (APPROX'16)
    conference ]
  • The Price of Anarchy in Large Games
    Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis
    ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2016 (STOC'16)
    conference | arxiv ]
  • Lottery Pricing Equilibria
    Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    conference ]
  • Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements
    Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    conference ]
  • Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tenneholtz
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    conference | journal | arxiv ]
  • On Voting and Facility Location
    Michal Feldman, Iddan Golumb, Amos Fiat
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    conference | arxiv ]
  • The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing
    Vincent Cohen-Addad, Michal Feldman, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    conference | arxiv ]
  • Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient
    Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier
    Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue on STOC'13, forthcoming
    conference | arxiv ]
  • Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model
    Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Svetlana Obraztsova
    Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) 2016: 496-501
    conference ]

2015

  • Capacitated Network Design Games
    Michal Feldman and Tom Ron
    Theory of Computing Systems, 57(3): 576-597 (2015)
    conference | journal ]
  • Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
    Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
    SODA 2015: 123-135
    conference | arxiv ]
  • Implementing the Wisdom of Waze
    Michal Feldman, Avinatan Hassidim, Shoshana Vasserman
    IJCAI 2015
    conference ]
  • How Robust is the Wisdom of the Crowds?
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz
    IJCAI 2015
    conference ]
  • A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games
    Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
    ICALP 2015
    conference ]
  • Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
    Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir
    Inf. Process. Lett. 115(2): 112-118 (2015)
    conference | journal ]
  • Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive BundlingEquilibrium
    Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein
    WINE 2015: 300-313
    conference | arxiv ]
  • A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes
    Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
    AAAI 2015: 872-878
    conference | arxiv ]
  • Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
    Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
    AAAI 2015: 879-885
    conference | arxiv | journal ]

2014

  • Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
    Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz
    ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(2): 5 (2014)
    conference | arxiv | journal ]
  • Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning inSocial Networks
    Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
    APPROX-RANDOM 2014: 192-208
    conference | arxiv ]
  • Clearing Markets via Bundles
    Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier
    SAGT 2014: 158-169
    conference | Preview | arxiv ]
  • Sequential Decision Making with Vector Outcomes
    Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz
    Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2014 (ITCS'14)
    conference ]
Tel Aviv University makes every effort to respect copyright. If you own copyright to the content contained here and / or the use of such content is in your opinion infringing, Contact us as soon as possible >>
Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel
UI/UX Basch_Interactive